

Projet de recherche DéCAF

Dépréciation comptable d'actifs financiers : problématique et résultats



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Projet de recherche DéCAF I

Problématique de la dépréciation comptable (ou de communication financière) des instruments financiers :

- analyse des principes normatifs,
- étude des pratiques,
- recommandations de mise en oeuvre ou de modélisation

Work supported by :

- Research Chair Management de la modélisation (ISFA BNP Paribas Cardif) : http://isfa.univ-lyon1.fr/m2a
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Projet de recherche DéCAF II

Projet réalisé par une équipe du laboratoire SAF composée de :

- Porteurs du projet :
 - Stéphane Loisel
 - Pierre Thérond
- Chercheurs associés :
 - Yahia Salhi
 - Alexis Bienvenüe
 - Nicolas Leboisne



Projet de recherche DéCAF III

Thèmes développés ou en cours de développement :

- impairment d'instruments de capitaux propres comptabilisés en AFS sous IAS 39
- expected credit losses d'investissements obligataires en IFRS 9
- modélisation et projection de PDD.





- 1 IAS 39 AFS equity securities
- 2 IFRS 9 Expected Credit Losses
- 3 DéCAF What else?

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2 IFRS 9 Expected Credit Losses

3 DéCAF - What else?

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1.1. Motivation

Joint work :

- Azzaz, Loisel & Thérond (2014) Some characteristics of an equity security next-year impairment, *Review of Quantitative Finance* Accounting
- Bienvenüe, Loisel & Thérond : working paper about multi-period developments

Framework :

- IFRS under use (at least til 2018) : IAS 39
- Top Management of Insurance groups has to incorporate financial reporting constraints and opportunities taking strategic decisions

Motivation

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1.1. Motivation

Table: Financial investments of some insurers in 2011

(Mds €)	Allianz	Axa	CNP Assurances	Generali
Balance Sheet Size Total equity AFS Assets AFS (Funds and equity se- curities)	641.472 47.253 333.880 26.188	730.085 50.932 355.126 20.636	321.011 13.217 231.709 27.618	423.057 18.120 175.649 20.53

1.1. Motivation

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Category	НТМ	AFS		HFT
Eligible se- curities	Bonds	Bonds	Others (stock, funds, etc.)	Everything
Valuation	Amortized cost	Fair Valu	Fair Value (through OCI)	
Impairment principle	Event of proven loss	Event of pro- ven loss	Significant or prolonged fall in the fair value	NA
Impairment trigger	Objective evidence res curred event (cf. IAS	e evidence resulting from an in- vent (cf. IAS 39 §59) Two critera (non- cumulative : cf. IFRIC July 2009) : significant or prolonged loss in the FV		
Impairment Value	Difference between the amortized cost and the revised value of future flows discounted at the original interest rate	In result : difference between reported va- lue (before impairment) and the FV		NA
Reversal of the impair- ment	Possible in specific cases	Possible in specific cases	Impossible	NA

Journée 100 % Actuaire, Paris, 7 novembre 2014 Présentation DéCAF | P.E. Thérond

IAS 39 AFS equity securities

IFRS 9 Expected Credit Losses DéCAF - What else ? Références

Motivation

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1.1. Motivation



Figure: Illustration : Total Stock price, 2010-2012 ($\alpha = 0.3$, s = 0.5y)

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1.1. Motivation

Table: Equity instruments impairment parameters used by some financial institutions (2011)

Group	Parameter <i>signi-</i> <i>ficant</i>	Paramètre <i>pro-</i> <i>longed</i> (months)	Additional crite- rion
Allianz	0.2	9	
Axa	0.2	6	
BNP Paribas	0.5	24	0.3 12 months
CNP	0.5	36	0.3 6 months
Crédit Agricole	0.4	Ø	0.2 6 months
Generali	0.5	36	·
Groupama	0.5	36	
ING	0.25	6	
Scor	0.5	24	0.3 12 months
Société Générale	0.5	24	·

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1.1. Motivation

Table: P&L and impairment losses resulting from equity securities classified as AFS 2011

(M€)	Allianz	Axa	CNP Assurances	Generali
Result Impairment losses on AFS funds	2804	4516	1141	1153
and equity securities	-2487	-860	-1600	-781

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1.2.1. Notations

Main notations :

- $S = (S_t)_{t \ge 0}$ the stock price process
- t_a the acquisition date
- $\lambda = (\lambda_s)_{s \in \{[t_a]+1, [t_a]+2, ...\}}$ the successive impairment losses (may be nil)
- $\Lambda(S, t_a, t) = \sum_{s = \lfloor t_a \rfloor + 1}^{t} \lambda(S, t_a, s)$ the sum of pas impairment losses
- $\Omega(S, t_a, t)$ the amount in OCI resulting from S at time t

At each reporting date t, the balance sheet equilibrium property leads to :

$$S_t - S_{t_a} = \Omega(S, t_a, t) + \Lambda_t.$$

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1.2.2. Impairment triggers

A necessary condition for considering an impairment loss at time t + 1 is :

$$\left\{ egin{array}{l} S_{t+1} \leq (1-lpha) S_{t_a}, \mathrm{or}; \ orall u \in \left]t+1-s, t+1
ight], S_u \leq S_{t_a}, \end{array}
ight.$$

where α and *s* are determined by the reporting entity. α represents the relative level of fall in fair value since the acquisition date corresponding to *significant* decline, *s* represents the minimum period before the financial reporting date that leads to consider that the decline is *prolonged*.

Moreover, there is an effective impairment loss if , in addition :

$$S_{t+1} \leq S_{t_a} - \Lambda_t.$$

Then, the impairment loss λ_{t+1} is given by :

$$\lambda_{t+1} = S_{t_a} - \Lambda_t - S_{t+1} = K_t - S_{t+1}.$$

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1.2.3. Probability and amount of impairment losses

Let us denote J_{t+1} the probability of an effective impairment loss at reporting date t+1 :

$$J_{t+1} = (S_{t+1} \leq (1-\alpha)S_{t_a}, S_{t+1} \leq K_t) \bigcup \left(\max_{t+1-s \leq u \leq t+1} S_u \leq S_{t_a}, S_{t+1} \leq K_t\right),$$

By introducing $m_t = \min((1 - \alpha)S_{t_a}, K_t)$, we have :

$$\mathbb{P}_t\left[J_{t+1}\right] = \mathbb{P}_t\left[S_{t+1} \le m_t\right] + \mathbb{P}_t\left[\max_{t+1-s \le u \le t+1} S_u \le S_{t_s}, S_{t+1} \le K_t\right] \\ - \mathbb{P}_t\left[\max_{t+1-s \le u \le t+1} S_u \le S_{t_s}, S_{t+1} \le m_t\right].$$

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1.2.3. Probability and amount of impairment losses

Similarly, the impairment loss at time t + 1 is given by :

$$\lambda_{t+1} = (\mathcal{K}_t - \mathcal{S}_{t+1})^+ \mathbf{1} \left\{ \max_{t+1-s \leq u \leq t+1} \mathcal{S}_u \leq \mathcal{S}_{t_s} \cup \mathcal{S}_{t+1} \leq (1-\alpha) \mathcal{S}_{t_s} \right\},$$

with $K_t = S_{t_a} - \Lambda_t$. This expression can be expressed as a sum of three terms :

$$\lambda_{t+1} = X_{t+1} + Y_{t+1} - Z_{t+1},$$

avec

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{X}_{t+1} = (K_t - S_{t+1})^+ \mathbf{1} \left\{ \max_{t+1-s \leq u \leq t+1} S_u \leq S_{t_a} \right\}, \\ \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} = (K_t - S_{t+1})^+ \mathbf{1} \left\{ S_{t+1} \leq (1-\alpha) S_{t_a} \right\}, \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{Z}_{t+1} = (K_t - S_{t+1})^+ \mathbf{1} \left\{ \max_{t+1-s \leq u \leq t+1} S_u \leq S_{t_a} \right\} \mathbf{1} \left\{ S_{t+1} \leq (1-\alpha) S_{t_a} \right\}. \end{array}$$



1.2.3. Probability and amount of impairment losses

The three terms could be seen as payoffs of options of S :

- the first one : a *rear-end up-and-out* put option (cf. Hui (1997))
- the second one : a traditional European put option,
- the third one corresponding to the sum of a *rear-end up-and-out* put option and a compensation amount.

The main objective of our work is to exhibit some characteristics of future impairment losses (with a one-year horizon) for risk management purposes (prediction, risk measures and decisions), the following results are obtained :

- using option theory;
- under the real-world probability measure.

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1.3. Main results

Considering a Black & Scholes framework (i.e. a geometric brownian motion), we obtain closed formulas for (one-year horizon) :

- the probability that some impairment occurs,
- the expectation of impairment losses,
- the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of impairment losses.

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1.3. Main results

Theorem (Impairment probability)

The probability to recognize an impairment at future time t + 1, given the information \mathcal{F}_t at time t, is given by

$$\mathbb{P}_{t}\left[J_{t+1}\right] = \left(\frac{S_{t_{a}}}{S_{t}}\right)^{k_{1}-1} \left[\Psi_{\rho}\left(C, D(K_{t})\right) - \Psi_{\rho}\left(C, D(m_{t})\right)\right] \\ + \Phi\left(-A(K_{t})\right) + \Psi_{\rho}\left(B, A(K_{t})\right) - \Psi_{\rho}\left(B, A(m_{t})\right)$$

where Φ denotes the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution, and Ψ_{ρ} is the bivariate normal distribution function : for all x, y, $\Psi_{\rho}(x, y) = \mathbb{P}_t [X \le x, Y \le y]$ where (X, Y) is a Gaussian vector with standard marginals and correlation ρ .

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1.3. Main results

Other terms, for $x \in \{m_t, K_t\}$: $A(x) = \frac{\ln(S_t/x) + \mu}{\sigma} - \frac{\sigma}{2}, A'(x) = A(x) + \sigma,$ $B = \frac{\ln(S_t/S_{t_a}) + \mu(1-s)}{\sigma\sqrt{(1-s)}} - \frac{\sigma\sqrt{(1-s)}}{2}, B' = B + \sigma\sqrt{(1-s)},$ $C = \frac{\ln(S_{t_a}/S_t) + \mu(1-s)}{\sigma\sqrt{(1-s)}} - \frac{\sigma\sqrt{(1-s)}}{2}, C' = C + \sigma\sqrt{(1-s)},$ $D(x) = \frac{\ln(S_{t_a}^2/S_{tx}) + \mu}{\sigma} - \frac{\sigma}{2}, D'(x) = D(x) + \sigma,$ $k_1 = \frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2},$

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1.3. Main results

Theorem (Impairment loss expectation)

The expectation of next-year impairment, given the information \mathcal{F}_t at time t, is given by

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\lambda_{t+1} \right] &= S_{t} e^{\mu} \left(\frac{S_{t_{a}}}{S_{t}} \right)^{k_{1}-1} \left[\Psi_{-\rho} \left(C', -D'(K_{t}) \right) - \Psi_{-\rho} \left(C', -D'(m_{t}) \right) \right] \\ &+ S_{t} e^{\mu} \left[\Psi_{\rho} \left(-B', -A'(m_{t}) \right) - \Phi \left(-A'(m_{t}) \right) - \Psi_{\rho} \left(-B', -A'(K_{t}) \right) \right] \\ &+ K_{t} \left[\Psi_{\rho} \left(-B, -A(K_{t}) \right) + \Phi \left(-A(m_{t}) \right) - \Psi_{\rho} \left(-B, -A(m_{t}) \right) \right] \\ &+ \left(K_{t} - m_{t} \right) \left(\frac{S_{t_{a}}}{S_{t}} \right)^{k_{1}-1} \left[\Phi \left(-D(m_{t}) \right) - \Psi_{\rho} \left(-C, -D(m_{t}) \right) \right] \\ &- K_{t} \left(\frac{S_{t_{a}}}{S_{t}} \right)^{k_{1}-1} \Psi_{-\rho} \left(C, -D(K_{t}) \right) + m_{t} \left(\frac{S_{t_{a}}}{S_{t}} \right)^{k_{1}-1} \Psi_{-\rho} \left(C, -D(m_{t}) \right), \end{split}$$

where all constant numbers, variables and parameters are defined in Theorem 1.

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1.3. Main results

Two sensitivity results :

Theorem (Probability sensitivity)

The probability is decreasing according to α , μ , Λ and s. Moreover, the probability is convex according to α , μ , μ and s.

Theorem (Expectation sensitivity)

The expected impairment loss is decreasing according to α , μ , Λ and s, non-decreasing with σ . Moreover, it is convex according to α , μ , σ and Λ , and concave with s.

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1.3. Main results

Theorem (Cumulative distribution function of impairment loss)

The cumulative distribution function of the next-year impairment loss, given the information \mathcal{F}_t available at time t, is given by :

$$\mathbb{P}_{t}\left[\lambda_{t+1} \leq I\right] = \begin{cases} \left(1 - \mathbb{P}_{t}\left[J_{t+1}\right]\right) + \Phi\left(A(K_{t} - I)\right) - \Phi\left(A(K_{t})\right) \\ + \left(\frac{S_{t_{a}}}{S_{t}}\right)^{k_{1} - 1} \left[\Psi_{\rho}\left(C, D(K_{t})\right) - \Psi_{\rho}\left(C, D(K_{t} - I)\right)\right] \\ + \Psi_{\rho}\left(B, A(K_{t})\right) - \Psi_{\rho}\left(B, A(K_{t} - I)\right) \\ \Phi\left(A(K_{t} - I)\right) \\ K_{t} - m_{t} < I \leq K_{t}, \end{cases}$$

with the same notations and variables as in 1.

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1.4. Illustrations



Figure: Average next-year impairment as a function of μ and σ (left), and of α and Λ (right).

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1.4. Illustrations

Table: One-year expected loss for TOTAL according to past impairment losses

				1011 50		
S_t	۸	$\mathbb{P}_t\left[J_{t+1}\right]$	$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} \right]$	VaR(80%)	VaR(95%)	VaR(99.5%)
38.42	2.28975	0.5509	4.0699	10.7697	16.2236	21.402
	4.5795	0.5075	3.3007	8.4799	13.9338	19.1123
	22.8975	0.0078	0.0124	0	0	0.7943
	34.34625	0	0	0	0	0

Total. $S_{t_a} = 45.795$

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1.4. Illustrations

Table: Impact of impairment parameters (Axa et Generali) for five stocks

	Axa		(Generali
BNP Paribas	$\mathbb{P}_t [J_{t+1}]$ 0.3331 0.2762	$ \mathbb{E}_{t} \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{t+1} \mid J_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} \\ 21.3545 \\ 10.3336 \end{bmatrix} $	$\mathbb{P}_t [J_{t+1}]$ 0.0698 0.011	$\frac{\mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\lambda_{t+1} \mid J_{t+1} \right]}{33.8002}$ 20.3283
Carrefour Pernod Ricard	0.2851 0.2374	8.7095 13.1027	0.0162	16.4673 32.1938
Total	0.2365	9.7935	0.00069	24.2181

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1.5. A glimpse inside the multi-period analysis

Work in progress with A. Bienvenüe.



Motivation Credit Losses Impairment Credit Risk Monitoring Empirical Analysis



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- Motivation
- Credit Losses Impairment
- Credit Risk Monitoring
- Empirical Analysis

3 DéCAF - What else?



2.1. Motivation

Presentation based on the joint work : Y. Salhi & P.-E. Thérond (2014) Alarm System for Credit Losses Impairment under IFRS 9, *Working paper ISFA*.

Framework

- Post Financial crisis IFRS standards
- IFRS 9 : Financial Instruments published by IASB on July 24, 2014
- Since equity securities have to be classified as Fair Value through PL, impairment losses stand for financial instruments which are eligible to amortized cost (or Fair Value through OCI)
- Moving from an *incurred* approach toward an *expected* one
- New rules inspired by loan pricing and risk management : what about non-banking financial institutions (e.g. insurers with bonds)?

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2.1. Motivation

Table: Figures from consolidated financial reports 2013. Debt instruments measured at fair value through other comprehensive incomes (FVOCI), at amortized cost and at fair value through profit or loss (FVPL) are reported. The bottom panel depicts the percentage of debt instruments over the total financial investments detained by the considered companies.

	Allianz	Axa	CNP Assurances	Generali
Total financial investments	411.02	450.04	339.56	342.04
Debt instruments				
FVOCI	359.73	319.62	209.52	212.679
Amortized Cost	4.65	6.52	0.60	59.003
FVPL	2.37	34.24	30.32	8.691
Total	366.74	360.37	240.44	280.37
	89%	80%	71%	82%

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2.2. Credit Losses Impairment



* Presentation option for equity investments to present fair value changes in OCI

Figure: Classification & Measurement of financial assets

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2.2. Credit Losses Impairment

1



Change in credit risk since initial recognition

<u> </u>		
ECL Allowance recognized		
12 month ECL (ECLadjusted for probability of default in the next 12months)	Lifetime ECL	Lifetime ECL
Interest revenue	 	
Gross basis	l Gross basis	Net basis
Stage 1 Performing	Stage 2 Underperforming	Stage 3 Non-performing

Figure: Overview of the general impairment model

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2.2. Credit Losses Impairment I

To assess credit risk, the entity should consider *the likelihood of not collecting some or all of the contractual cash-flows over the remaining maturity of the financial instrument*, i.e. to assess the evolution of the probability of default (and not of the loss-given default for example).

The standard did not impose a particular method for this assessment but it included the two following operational simplifications :

- For financial instruments with 'low-credit risk' at the reporting date, the entity should continue to recognize 12-month ECL;
- there is a rebuttable presumption of significant increase in credit risk when contractual payments are more than 30 days past due.

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2.2. Credit Losses Impairment II



In practice, most credit risk watchers rely on ratings released by major agencies, e.g. Moody's, Standard & Poors and Fitch among others. There have been strong criticism about the accuracy of ratings, for example :

- lack of timeliness (cf. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) and Bolton et al. (2012))
- too slowly downgrading (cf. Morgenson (2008))
- unability to predict some high-profile bankruptcies (cf. Buchanan (2009))

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2.3. Credit Risk Monitoring

In order to assess a significant increase in credit risk, we propose a monitoring procedure based on implied default intensities of CDS prices.

It consists in modelling CDS prices and an alarm system based on quickest detection procedure (cf. Poor and Hadjiliadis (2009)).

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2.3.1. Modelling I

Letting τ be the random time of the default event, the present value of the CDS fixed leg, denoted FIL(T_0 , [**T**], T, S_0), is given by

$$FIL(T_0, [\mathbf{T}], T, S_0) = S_0 \sum_{j=0}^n B(T_0, T_j) \alpha_j \tau > T_j,$$
(2)

where B(t, T) is the price at time t of a default-free zero-coupon bond maturing at T, i.e. $B(t, T) = \exp\left(-\int_t^T r_s ds\right)$ and r_s is the risk-free interest rate.

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2.3.1. Modelling II

Similarly, the present value of the floating leg $FLL(T_0, [\mathbf{T}], T, L)$, that is the payment of the protection seller contingent upon default, equals

$$\mathsf{FLL}(T_0, [\mathbf{T}], T, L) = L_{\mathsf{GD}} \sum_{i=0}^n B(T_0, T_j) \tau \in [T_{j-1}, T_j], \tag{3}$$

where L_{GD} is the loss given default being the fraction of loss over the all exposure upon the occurrence of a credit event of the reference company.

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2.3.1. Modelling III

We denote by $CDS(T_0, [\mathbf{T}], T, S_t, L_{GD})$ the price at time T_0 of the above CDS. The pricing mechanism for this product relies on the risk-neutral probability measure \mathbb{Q} , the assumptions on interest-rate dynamics and the default time τ . Accordingly, the price is given as follows

$$[I] CDS(T_0, [\mathbf{T}], T, S_t, L_{GD}) = \mathbb{E} \left[S_0 \sum_{j=0}^n B(T_0, T_j) \alpha_j \tau > T_j \right] \\ -\mathbb{E} \left[L_{GD} \sum_{j=0}^n B(T_0, T_j) \tau \in [T_{j-1}, T_j] \right],$$

where $\mathbb E$ denotes the risk neutral expectation (under probability measure $\mathbb Q).$ For a given maturity, the market quote convention consists in the

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2.3.1. Modelling IV

rate S_0 being set so that the fixed and floating legs match at inception. Precisely, the price of the CDS is obtained as the fair rate S_t such that

 $\mathsf{CDS}(\mathit{T}_0,[\mathbf{T}],\mathit{T},\mathit{S}_0,\mathit{L}_{\mathsf{GD}})=0,$

which yields to the following formulation of the premium

$$S_{0} = L_{\text{GD}} \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{n} B(T_{0}, T_{j}) \mathbb{E} \left[\tau \in [T_{j-1}, T_{j}]\right]}{\sum_{j=0}^{n} B(T_{0}, T_{j}) \alpha_{j} \mathbb{E} \left[\tau > T_{j}\right]}.$$
(4)

Note that the two expectations in the above equation can be expressed using the risk-neutral probability $\mathbb Q$ as follows :

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\tau \in [T_{j-1}, T_j]\right] = \mathbb{Q}(T_{j-1} \le \tau \le T_j) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}\left[\tau > T_j\right] = \mathbb{Q}(\tau \ge T_j).$$

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2.3.2. Market-Implied Default Intensities

The real-world DI are estimated from statistics on average cumulative default rates published by Moody's between 1970 and 2003. The implied DI are estimated from market prices of the CDS in the US market.

Table: Average real world and market-implied default intensities based on 5-year CDS

Rating	Actual DI	Implied DI
Aaa	0.04%	0.67%
Aa	0.06%	0.78%
Α	0.13%	1.28%
Baa	0.47%	2.38%
Ba	2.40%	5.07%
В	7.49%	9.02%
Below B	16.90%	21.30%

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2.3.3. Quickest detection problem I



We assume that the time varying intensity λ_t obeys to the following dynamics

$$\log \lambda_t = \underline{\mu} + \sigma \epsilon_t, \tag{5}$$

where, ϵ_t is a a zero-mean homoscedastic white noise and $\underline{\mu}$ and σ are some constant parameters. The trend $\underline{\mu}$ is assumed to be deterministic and known. With credit quality deterioration in mind, the intensity λ_t (in logarithmic scale) may change its drift $\underline{\mu}$ in the future at an unknown time θ referred to, henceforth, as a change-point. We assume that the change-point θ is fully inaccessible knowing the pattern of λ_t . It can be either ∞ (in case of absence of change) or any value in the positive integers.

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2.3.3. Quickest detection problem II

After the occurrence time θ the λ_t 's evolve as follows :

$$\log \lambda_t = \overline{\mu} + \sigma \epsilon_t, \tag{6}$$

where $\overline{\mu}$ is the new drift, which is assumed to be deterministic and known. The quickest detection objective imposes that t_d^c must be as close as possible to θ . Meanwhile, we balance the latter with a desire to minimize false alarms.

For this detection strategy, it is shown that the cumulative sums (cusum for short) is optimal.



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2.3.3. Quickest detection problem III

More formally, if one fix a given false alarm to π , which stands for the time until a false alarm, the stopping time $t_d^c = \inf\{t \ge 0; V_t \ge m\}$ is optimal for triggering an alarm. Here, V_t is the process given by

$$V_t = \max_{1 \le s \le t} \left(\prod_{k=s}^t L(\log \lambda_k) \right), \quad S_0 = 0,$$

where $x \to L(x)$ is the likelihood ratio function. In view of our model the likelihood function L(x) is given as follows

$$L(x) = \frac{\overline{\mu} - \underline{\mu}}{\sigma} \left(x - \frac{\overline{\mu} - \underline{\mu}}{2\sigma} \right).$$

Motivation Credit Losses Impairment Credit Risk Monitoring Empirical Analysis



2.3.3. Quickest detection problem IV

- The log-likelihood process *L* works as a measure of the adequacy of the observation with the underlying model in 5.
- The process V can be interpreted as a sequential cumulative log-likelihood. The latter is :
 - equal to 0 when the incoming information of the log-intensity does not suggest any deviation from the model in (5)
 - greater than 0, we can interpret this as a deviation from the model in (5). This means that the 'real' model stands in between (5) and (6).
- In order to declare that the intensity is evolving with respect to the model in (6) one needs a constraint in order to characterize the barrier *m*. This is typically achieved by imposing that the optimal time to raise a false alarm when no change occurs should be postponed as long as possible.

Motivation Credit Losses Impairment Credit Risk Monitoring Empirical Analysis

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2.4.1. Educational example : AIG I



Figure: CDS spreads between January 1st, 2005 and December 31st, 2010 on AIG for different maturities : 1-year (red), 5-year (blue) and 10-year (black).

Motivation Credit Losses Impairment Credit Risk Monitoring Empirical Analysis

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2.4.1. Educational example : AIG II



Figure: Time-series plot of AIG's market implied intensity process for different CDS maturities : 1-year (red), 5-year (blue) and 10-year (black)

Motivation Credit Losses Impairment Credit Risk Monitoring Empirical Analysis

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2.4.1. Educational example : AIG III



Figure: The evolution of the process V since the initial recognition in September 1, 2006.

Motivation Credit Losses Impairment Credit Risk Monitoring Empirical Analysis



2.4.2. Other illustrations

Table: The grade change column corresponds to the time the entity's grade witnessed the main downgrade during the period of interest.

	Main Change	Alarm		Grade Change	Alarm
Industrials			Financials		
Boeing co.	3/15/06 (A2)	_	HSBC	3/9/09 (C+)	1/21/08
Siemens		_	Allianz	8/26/04 (Aa3)	3/17/08
Alstom	5/7/08 (Baa1)	_	UBS	7/4/08 (B-)	7/27/07
Technology			AXA	3/19/03 (A2)	· <u> </u>
Google Inc.	7/5/10 (Aa2)	_	Dexia	10/01/08 (C-)	7/20/07
Cap Gemini	not rated	_	Merill Lynch	not rated	9/17/08
Alcatel-Lucent	11/7/07 (Ba3)	_	Con. Goods		
Consumer Services			Nestlé	8/15/07 (Aa1)	12/4/07
Pearson	12/2/98 (Baa1)	_	Coca Cola co.	8/21/92 (Aa3)	
Carrefour	3/23/11 (Baa1)	8/9/11	Procter & Gamble	10/19/01 (Aa3)	_
Marks & Spencer	7/13/04 (Baa2)	· -	L'Oréal	not rated	_
Utilities			Energy		
Iberdrola	6/15/12 (Baa1)	9/30/11	Total	2/2/11 (Aa1)	11/8/07
SUEZ	8/18/08 (Aa3)	· <u> </u>	Schlumberger	9/22/03 (A1)	
Healthcare			Repsol	5/16/05 (Baa1)	_
Sanofi	2/18/11 (A2)	3/7/08	Basic Materials		
Pfizer inc.	3/11/09 (Aa2)	· -	Arcelor	11/6/12 (Ba1)	_
	/		Solvav	9/5/11 (Baa1)	_



This approach should lead to further examination of bond issuers for which alarm sounded. The effective impairment should rely on closer investigation of their financial position, e.g. financial analyses and non-quantitative information.





1 IAS 39 AFS equity securities

2 IFRS 9 Expected Credit Losses

3 DéCAF - What else?

Journée 100 % Actuaire, Paris, 7 novembre 2014 Présentation DéCAF | P.E. Thérond



DéCAF - What else?



Work in progress :

- portfolio assessment of expected credit losses;
- multi-period framework for equity securities at FVOCI (fol. of Azzaz et al. (2014))
- other stock price models : regime-switching, Levy, etc.
- projection de PDD

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